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Tribal Courts' Failure to Protect Native
American Women: A Reevaluation of the
Indian Civil Rights Act
Carla Christofferson
Congress has always exercised control over Native American1 peoples
through its plenary powers.2 In 1968, that control took the form of the Indian
Civil Rights Act (ICRA).3 The ICRA represents a congressional decision to
limit Native American sovereignty by setting forth an Indian Bill of Rights that
applies to Native American tribes.4 It is Congress' effort to protect individuals
from tribal abuses. By designing a special Indian Bill of Rights,. Congress
1. This Note uses the terms Native American, American Indian, and Indian interchangeably. This usage
is not meant to offend any individual's or group's preference, but to reflect the variety of terms used in
federal Indian law.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 3 ('The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."); see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553 (1903) (Congress has plenary power to abrogate provisions of Indian treaty).
The plenary doctrine has been sharply criticized as embracing racial and cultural prejudice against
Native Americans and as implying that they are inferior and require guardianship by Congress. These
criticisms notwithstanding, courts are bound by the Supreme Court's rulings that Congress may limit the
sovereign rights of Indian tribes. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Ross Swimmer, 740 F. Supp. 9,
11 (D.D.C. 1990).
3. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1988)).
4. Before the ICRA, courts followed Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), which stated that the Bill
of Rights does not apply to Indian tribes.
5. The Act includes most of the Bill of Rights verbatim. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
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recognized that Native American tribes were distinct sovereigns, but it placed
limits on how they could exercise such sovereignty.
6
Although the central purpose of the ICRA is to "protect individual Indians
from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments,"7 the Supreme Court
limited this protection in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez by ruling that habeas
corpus is the only mechanism of judicial review provided by the ICRA. In
providing no remedy for civil rights violations, the Santa Clara ruling has left
Native American women virtually paralyzed within a system that subordinates
women.
9
This Note argues that an expansion of the ICRA is necessary to protect
Native American women from discriminatory actions by their tribes. One Native
American woman has stated: "My only crime is being born a female. I want
the same rights as the men-the right to vote for a chief and the right to live
on the reservation." 10 Women who are discriminated against because of gen-
der-biased tribal membership codes suffer both financially and psychologically.
They no longer receive federal Indian benefits, such as annuities from the tribe,
access to education and health programs, and housing." Moreover, they suffer
the loss of their cultural identity, because they lose the right to live on the
reservation with their family and friends."
Part I of this Note examines the limitations on Native American sovereignty
and the passage of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, in which Congress
endorsed the concept of limited tribal sovereignty. Part II examines the Supreme
Court's attempt to establish firm sovereignty boundaries in Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez.3 This Note goes on to argue that the denial of a federal forum
in Santa Clara renders the ICRA inadequate to protect the rights of Native
American individuals. Part III describes how the ICRA in its present form fails
to safeguard the rights of Native American women. It argues that an expansion
of the ICRA is needed to remedy the gender discrimination facing women
6. Native Americans have never enjoyed sovereignty in the fullest sense. Sovereignty is defined, in
part, as "[t]he power to do everything in a state without accountability." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396
(6th ed. 1990). Native American tribal sovereignty is limited by what Congress is willing to tolerate. United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,323 (1978) (tribes have right to punish their members). Tribal sovereignty
may be divested either by federal law or when it is inconsistent with the overriding interests of the federal
government. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160-61
(1980) (state can tax Indians making purchases on reservation other than their own).
7. S. REP. No. 841, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1967).
8. 436 U.S. 49, 69-70 (1978).
9. Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 671, 702 (1989).
10. Joe Volz, Pocahontas' Legacy Law on Mixed Marriages Threatens Tribe's Future, CHI. TRIB., Apr.
9, 1989, at N7 (quoting Kim Taylor, a Native American woman who, unlike men in her tribe, is not allowed
to bring her white spouse to live on reservation).
11. KATHLEEN JAMIESON, INDIAN WOMEN AND THE LAW IN CANADA: CrrIzENS MINUs 67-70 (1978)
(discussing economic problems in both Canada and United States).
12. Pam Paul, Report prepared for the Native Women's Association of Canada (1989) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author). The practice of denying women the right to live on the reservation also
occurs in the United States. See Volz, supra note 10.
13. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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within tribal systems. Finally, Part IV proposes an amendment to the Indian
Civil Rights Act designed to empower the Native American women in their
struggle to secure equal rights within the tribal system. The amendment pro-
vides specific gender protection to Native American women within their tribe
and gives the women a forum in which to bring their grievances.
I. THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: TowARD TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
In 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act.14 The ICRA recog-
nized the tribes' sovereignty and their inherent right to govern the Native
American peoples, but it stated that tribes would still be subject to constitutional
guidelines resembling the Bill of Rights.15 Few Native Americans saw the
ICRA as a protection of their individual rights against tribal violations. Instead,
most Indians saw it as a federal intrusion into tribal affairs.
16
Congress stated that this "Indian Bill of Rights" was needed to protect
individual Indians against abuses by the tribes17 because Indians had no federal
or state constitutional rights vis-h-vis the tribes."i In order to justify the impo-
sition of these federally created rights, the ICRA restated the idea of limited
sovereignty: Indian sovereignty exists alongside the plenary right of Congress
to regulate and modify the status of tribes.1 9 In this respect, tribal rights re-
semble the rights of the states.2"
In the years surrounding the passage of the ICRA, the Supreme Court
struggled with the limits of tribal sovereignty. One attempt to define the scope
of this sovereignty is the preemptive test, which was set out in Williams v.
Lee.2 In that case, the Supreme Court held a state law inapplicable if it in-
14. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1988)). The ICRA marked the
entrance into the modem era of federal Indian law. Although a detailed history of federal Indian policy is
beyond the scope of this Note, the position of the United States government generally has moved from an
emphasis on integration to a focus on increased tribal sovereignty.
The United States advanced the integration position during two eras. The first era, which was marked
by efforts at assimilation, lasted from the beginning of colonization until the end of World War IL For a
discussion of this period in Native American history, see VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE,
AMERICAN INDIANs, AMERICAN JUSTICE 1-15 (1983). In the second era, the government designed a program
of termination to eliminate all the special restrictions and privileges that went with the "Indian" label. H.R.
Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (l953).
Finally, the 1960's ushered in the movement for Indian sovereignty, culminating in the passage of
the ICRA. This Act advanced the tribal sovereignty position in federal Indian policy. The ICRA recognized
a limited tribal sovereignty requiring the tribal governments to act within quasi-constitutional bounds.
15. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
16. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 246 (2d ed. 1988).
17. S. REP. No. 841, supra note 7, at 5-6.
18. It is normally not possible to invoke the Bill of Rights or Fourteenth Amendment against a tribe.
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-83 (1896).
19. For a discussion of the plenary powers of Congress, see supra note 2.
20. For example, the Court in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471
U.S. 845, 851-52 (1985), cited authority involving state courts and drew a direct analogy between tribes
and states.
21. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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fringed on a tribe's right to make its own laws and to be governed by them. 2
The Williams Court favored protecting tribal autonomy, but the 1978 Supreme
Court limited tribal autonomy by holding in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe' that Indian tribes did not have criminal authority over non-Indians on
the reservation except as permitted by Congress.' Three months later, the
Court switched sides again in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez. 25 By denying
federal protection against gender discrimination to an Indian woman,26 the
Court refused to encroach upon the sovereignty of a tribe.
II. SANTA CLARA: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY TAKES THE DAY
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez addressed the conflict between Indian
autonomy and gender discrimination. Julia Martinez and her daughter chal-
lenged a Santa Clara Pueblo membership ordinance that disqualified Mrs.
Martinez's children because Mrs. Martinez had married outside of the tribe.27
The membership ordinance placed no such restriction on men.28 Martinez
argued that the membership rule discriminated against her solely on the basis
of sex, and therefore, the Act violated Title I of the ICRA. Title I states that
"[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws ....
The Supreme Court considered three issues in Santa Clara: (1) whether
tribes had waived their immunity to suit in federal court under the ICRA;
(2) which court was the proper forum in which to challenge violations of the
ICRA; and (3) whether habeas corpus relief was the only remedy available
under the ICRA.
22. Id. at 220-23.
23. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
24. Id. at 210.
25. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
26. Id. at 72-73.
27. Mrs. Martinez brought this case in federal district court. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F.
Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975). Native Americans can always bring their claims in tribal court, but this may be
futile in some instances. For example, the Santa Clara tribe has a single governing body, the Council, which
possesses both legislative and appellate judicial powers. Original jurisdiction is vested in the Governor.
However, the Governor is appointed by the Council. SANTA CLARA CONST. art. IV, §§ 1-2, summarized
in Martinez, 402 F. Supp. at 13. Therefore, Mrs. Martinez would have had to bring her grievances to the
same ruling body that adopted the discriminatory membership laws.
28. The sections of the ordinance read in pertinent part:
2. [C]hildren born of marriages between male members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-
members shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
3. [C]hildren born of marriages between female members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-
members shall not be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 52 n.2.
29. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1988).
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A. Sovereign Immunity
Although three months earlier the Court had limited the territorial sovereign
powers of tribal governments, 30 the Court now chose to expand sovereignty
by holding that "Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the com-
mon-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers."
31
The Court went on to state that a waiver of sovereign immunity must therefore




According to the Court, the ICRA recognized that tribes are in the best
position to understand their own culture33 and therefore modified the Bill of
Rights to accommodate the "unique political, cultural, and economic needs of
tribal governments."' Under this exclusive forum doctrine, federal courts
should defer to the tribal courts' adjudication of civil matters.
35
However, a later decision read Santa Clara's exclusive forum doctrine
narrowly. The Tenth Circuit in Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone
Tribes ruled that if the tribal court fails to provide an adequate forum in which
to address civil grievances, a federal court may assume jurisdiction.36 Under
this reasoning, Mrs. Martinez would have been allowed access to federal court,
because her efforts in the tribal system had been prejudiced from the start.
37
30. See Oliphantv. Suquamish IndianTribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (Indian tribes lack authority topunish
non-Indian who commits crime on reservation). The distinction between Oliphant and Santa Clara is that
while Oliphant dealt with territorial sovereignty over non-Indians, Santa Clara did not question tribal
sovereignty over Indians.
31. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 58.
32. Id.
33. Tribes argue that the right to determine their own membership laws, however discriminatory, is
necessary for cultural survival. In response, Catharine MacKinnon asks: "Why is it seen as a matter of
cultural survival when men guarantee exclusive access to Indian women as a requirement of tribal member-
ship, but when an Indian woman attempts to claim that her family is an Indian family, to choose who to
make a family with, it's called a threat to cultural survival?" CATHARiNE A. MACKINNON, Whose Culture?
A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa Clam Pueblo (1983), in FEMriSM UNMODIMD 63, 67 (1987).
Moreover, the discriminatory treatment of women, which tribes sought to enforce by claiming it as
part of their culture, stands in sharp contrast to the equality women had enjoyed in tribal history. See infra
notes 68-75 and accompanying text; see also Resnik, supra note 9, at 705-12.
34. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 62-63 (footnote omitted).
35. See generally id. at 61-71 (discussing why tribal courts are "appropriate forums" for adjusting such
civil disputes).
36. 623 F.2d 682, 685 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981). The court reasoned that
"unwarranted intrusions" on personal liberty would be fundamentally unfair and inconsistent with the
underlying intent of the ICRA. Therefore, denial of an adequate forum would act as an implicit waiver of
the tribal court's immunity. Id. at 684-85.
37. See supra note 27.
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C. Habeas Corpus
In Santa Clara, the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress retained plenary
power over the Indian tribes but had, in passing the ICRA, provided only for
habeas corpus relief.3" Since Congress did not specifically include the remedy
of judicial review for civil actions, the Court reasoned, federal courts have no
right to interfere with the tribes' internal and social relationships.39 However,
in summarizing congressional intent, the Court declared: "[A] central purpose
of the ICRA and in particular of Title I was to 'secur[e] for the American
Indian the broad constitutional rights afforded to other Americans,' and thereby
to 'protect individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal govern-
ments.'"" Upon examining congressional intent, it is hard to imagine that
Congress wanted to protect individuals but was unwilling to provide a judicial
remedy ensuring such protection. Nevertheless, according to the Court, the
legislative history suggests that "Congress' failure to provide remedies other
than habeas corpus was a deliberate one," and the Court was unpersuaded that
fulfillment of the purposes of the ICRA requires intrusion into tribal sovereign-
ty.
4 1
Santa Clara left Native American women a right without a remedy. The
next part of this Note argues that Congress should resolve this quandary for
Native American women. Then, Part IV proposes a remedy that establishes
guidelines for amending legislation.
III. THE CASE FOR EXPANDING THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS Acr
After the Santa Clara decision, Native American women could not rely on
the protection of state and federal courts. Women denied tribal membership lost
essential benefits of membership, including federal payments, education, and
health services 2
Congress could have remedied this problem immediately, as it had done
when it passed the Major Crimes Act4 3 which reduced tribal sovereignty in
response to the Crow Dog decision." Indeed, the Supreme Court noted in
Santa Clara that if the tribal courts prove inadequate to apply and enforce the
38. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 61. "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any
person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe." 25
U.S.C. § 1303 (1988).
39. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 55-58, 69-72.
40. Id. at 61 (quoting S. REP. No. 841, supra note 7, at 5-6).
41. Id. at 61.
42. Deprivation of material benefits, especially medical care, was a central hardship factor driving the
Santa Clara case. Julia Martinez's daughter was denied medical treatment because she had no tribal
recognition and later died from strokes relating to her terminal illness. Brief for Respondent at 4, Santa
Clara (No. 76-682).
43. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 758 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988)).
44. Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). This case held that an Indian tribe had jurisdiction over
a case where one Indian murdered another on the reservation. Id. at 570-72.
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ICRA, Congress could similarly exercise its plenary power and grant federal
courts jurisdiction over civil rights violations.45
A. Findings of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission
The U.S. Civil Rights Commission recently held a series of hearings to
determine whether the statutory duty to enforce the ICRA is being fulfilled.'
Since Santa Clara, there have been 280 complaints of ICRA violations filed
against Indian tribes. 7 Most of the tribes' self-governing powers center on
the internal affairs of the community. 8 As a result, tribal membership and
participation of women are common targets of tribal ICRA violations. There-
fore, Native American women need specific gender protection to guarantee
them the rights enjoyed by other women in the United States.49
B. Weighing Individual and Group Rights
In its recent dealings with cultural minorities 5 the government has sought
to strike a balance between cultural and individual rights. Although groups
do not receive explicit rights, courts have frequently awarded them constitu-
tional protection. Relying on the privacy, speech, and association norms of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court has ruled that groups have the
right to refuse to divulge membership lists.52 Religious groups have also been
granted rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to obtain
45. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 56. At least one commentator has argued that the decision not to take
legislative action in the aftermath of Santa Clara illustrates the federal government's values: in United States
culture, it is acceptable to subordinate women. Resnik, supra note 9, at 755.
46. See generally Enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act: Hearings Before the United States
Commission on Civil Rights (July 3, 1986-Oct. 4, 1990) (establishing commission to determine effectiveness
of ICRA by holding open hearings throughout United States) [hereinafter Hearings].
47. 134 CONG. REC. SI1,652 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (discussing amendment to the ICRA proposed
by Senator Hatch referring to testimony by Department of Justice before United States Civil Rights
Commission).
48. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court of Mont., 424 U.S. 382, 389-90 (1976) (Indian tribe has power
to exercise jurisdiction in adoption proceeding involving members of tribe).
49. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (state's arbitrary preference for males over females,
without regard to qualifications, violates Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
50. The term "cultural minorities" refers to the many ethnic, religious, and racial groups that are present
in the United States. More than 100 ethnic groups and 170 American Indian groups have been identified.
HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS, at vi (1980).
51. In the area of Native American law, this has often led to jurisdictional confusion among the courts.
The courts have fluctuated between awarding jurisdiction to the states and awarding it to the tribes based
upon an unclear weighing of interests. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,
334 (1983) (state jurisdiction preempted when it interferes or is incompatible with tribal interests, unless
state interests are sufficient to justify state authority).
52. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63, 466 (1958) (order requiring
NAACP to produce membership list restricts members' freedom of association rights).
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exemptions from regulations that unnecessarily burden their religious prac-
tices 3
However, the government has sometimes found it necessary to infringe
upon a group's culture in order to preserve preemptory individual rights.-
Through antidiscrimination laws, the United States has attempted to change its
own culture, which has traditionally discriminated against minorities." The
government has imposed this change upon a culture that would prefer to main-
tain the status quo, despite its oppression of minorities 6
For example, the post-Civil War Reconstruction imposed a foreign culture
upon the South.57 One of the focal points of Southern culture had been the
belief that African Americans did not deserve the same rights as white males.
Judith Resnik observes that "[m]any of us [applauded] the imposition of federal
norms on communities that said that their culture, their custom, was to treat
whites differently than blacks. '58 This imposition on Southern culture repre-
sented a belief that groups, in this case African Americans, have a right to be
free from discrimination or stigmatization by the state.
59
The women's suffrage movement is another example of displacing cultural
norms in an effort to guarantee an important civil right.' Women won the
right to vote, even though the majority within the traditional Western culture
would have preferred to continue the historic inequality.61 Indeed, the United
53. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,215-19 (1972) (compulsory education law endangers
free exercise rights of Amish children); Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1975) (prison
regulations requiring short hair violate rights of American Indian inmates to freely practice their religion).
Similarly, during the Prohibition Era, certain cultural groups, namely Catholic and Jewish people, were
allowed to use wine in religious ceremonies, and until recently, Native Americans were permitted to use
peyote in traditional religious ceremonies. But see Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (Free
Exercise Clause does not prevent state from prohibiting sacramental peyote use).
54. These rights include: freedom of religion, speech, and association; equal representation; fair trial;
and protection of property. "Individuals should be equally protected in their access to these rights without
distinction as to race, color, sex, religion, or national origin." Sharon O'Brien, Cultural Rights in the United
States: A Conflict of Values, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 267, 283 (1987).
55. See, e.g., JAMES OLSON, THE ETHNIc DIMENSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 44 (1979) (providing
history of enslavement of African Americans); Ronald Takaki, Reflections on Racial Patterns in America:
An Historical Perspective, in I ETHNICrrY AND PUBLIC POLICY 1, 5 (Van Home ed., 1982) (discussing
events surrounding 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act).
56. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
57. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ. 1013, 1063-
69 (1984) (referring to fact that Thirteenth Amendment was enacted by excluding participation ofrepresenta-
tives of defeated Confederate States). Similarly, the civil rights movement imposed values on the whole
of the United States.
58. Resnik, supra note 9, at 747.
59. The Thirteenth Amendment, in addition to abolishing slavery, also gave Congress the power to
abolish "all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States." The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20
(1883).
60. Susan B. Anthony and 13 other women were arrested in 1872 when they first attempted to cast
their votes. A criminal charge was entered against them for "having voted without the lawful right to vote,"
a charge which carried a possible three-year jail term. BARBARA A. BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW 8-9 (1975).
61. Six states-Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia-have
never ratified the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution which grants women the right to vote. ALAN
P. GRIMES, DaiOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITrrTION 96 (1978).
1991] Indian Civil Rights Act
States has gradually awarded more protection to women by striking down dis-
criminatory work practices 62 and pay scales. 63 Likewise, courts have begun
to demand equality of treatment by other groups which have traditionally
discriminated against women.64
C. The Victimization of Native American Women
Native American people, and in particular Native American women, have
suffered a longer history of discrimination in the United States than any
minority group. Much of this discrimination arose out of the government's
policies of assimilation,65 termination,66 and genocide.67
Although historically nonsexist, Native American cultures have been altered
by contact with European cultures. Historically, in many North American Indian
tribes, women enjoyed equal rights with men and in some cases were even
considered superior to men. Descriptions from colonial times stated that "[w]o-
men received the honor and respect that no other people gave their women." 68
62. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (company's policy of excluding
women from certain positions and state laws restricting women's work hours violated Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
63. The Equal Pay Act was enacted in 1963.29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988). The Act prohibits an employer
from discriminating "between employees on the basis of sex." See also Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421
F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970) (equal pay for "equal" work mandated under
Act does not require jobs to be identical, but only substantially equal).
64. Resnik, supra note 9, at 747 n.365 (discussing decisions forcing traditionally men-only clubs to
admit women). Even Ronald Garet, who argues for the increased importance of group rights, recognizes
that "[ilt is by no means certain that protection of Santa Clara communality requires enforcement of the
discriminatory membership rule." Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1065 n.157 (1983).
65. See FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 661 (1982) (national policy "sought to
assimilate the Indians and end their distinctive status by persuasion and strong inducements, sometimes
backed by indirect coercion").
66. "Termination" refers to the policies advanced by the United States government in which it attempted
to terminate the special relationship between the federal government and the Native American tribes. Some
aspects of the termination program included transferring tribal land into private ownership, awarding states
jurisdiction over tribal territory, and eliminating federal services to Native Americans. CANBY, supra note
16, at 52-54. See generally COHEN, supra note 65, at 152-80 (discussing termination periods advanced by
United States government).
67. An investigation into the United States Indian Health Service estimated that the Service had
sterilized more than 25% of all American Indian women and had usually talked the women into the
operation in a "very authoritarian, or coercive manner." Who Are These Women?, in Hearings, supra note
46, at 23-25 (Mar. 19-20, 1979) (exhibit submitted by Women of All Red Nations).
For a documented account of the systematic plunder and elimination of the American Indians, see DEE
BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1970).
President Jackson, known as Sharp Knife by Indians, and his soldiers slaughtered thousands of southern
Indians during his frontier career. Id. at 5.
68. RICHARD P. BOWLES Er. AL., THE INDIAN: ASSIMILATION, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION? 176-77
(1972) (speaking specifically about characteristics of the Iroquois Indians in New York); see also I AM THE
FIRE OF TIME: THE VOICES OF NATIVE AMERICAN WOMEN, at xvii (Jane B. Katz ed., 1977) [hereinafter
FIRE OF TIME] ("Most Indian societies acknowledged woman's vital role in the creative process. In tribal
ceremonies and lore she was portrayed as the giver of life. Pueblo peoples prayed for 'female rain.' Some
tribes believed that woman had mystical power over the life cycle."); JOHN U. TERRELL & DONNA M.
TERRELL, INDIAN WOMEN OF THE WESTERN MORNING: THEIR LIFE IN EARLY AMERICA 27 (1974) ('The
assertion that an Indian woman was an abject drudge of her tribe's men, both before and after marriage,
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Indeed, some tribes were completely matrilineal, matrifocal, and matrilocal; 69
and in many Indian cultures, personal property belonged to the women, not to
their husbands.70 Although a division of labor existed between the sexes, that
division was considered complementary and not a symbol of subordinate status
as in Western culture. 1
In the political arena as well, women were considered equal to men. For
instance, in the Iroquois tribe, women played the major role in the selection
of the tribe's ruling body:
When a chief died, the women of his tribe and clan held a meeting at
which a candidate for the vacant place was decided upon. A woman
delegate carried the news to the chiefs of the clans which belonged to
the 'side' of the deceased chief's clan. They had the power to veto the
selection, in which case another women's meeting was called and
another candidate selected ....72
The Europeans, however, found this to be counterintuitive to their vision of the
"proper" status of women and sought to teach the Indians "suitable" sex
roles. 3 They believed women should fit the role of a helpless helpmate. One
California Indian agent reported that she "hoped to correct" the Indian woman's
practice of retaining her maiden name and passing it on to her daughters.74
The United States government attempted to assimilate Indians into the dominant
society by destroying aspects of the Indian culture. One of the casualties of
Native American culture was equality for Indian women. The United States
government chose only Indian men as leaders because in their society only men
could be rulemakers.
75
Now the United States has stepped back from the discriminatory culture
it helped to create, leaving Indian women to fend for themselves. Although the
is completely without foundation.").
69. See ROBERT H. LOWIE, INDIANS OF THE PLAINS 96-97 (1954) (referring to the tribes of the Crow,
Hidatsa, Mandan, and Pawnee); TERRELL & TERRELL, supra note 68, at 28-29 (matrilineal tribes included
Iroquois, Siouan, Mohegan, Delaware, Powhatan, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Seminole, Caddoan linguistic
family, Pawnee, Hidatsa, Mandan, Oto, Missouri, Crow, Navajo, Hopi, Laguna, Acoma, and Zuni).
70. TERRELL & TERRELL, supra note 68, at 29; Linda J. Lacey, The White Man's Law and the
American Indian Family in the Assimilation Era, 40 ARK. L. REV. 327, 344 (1986).
71. TERRELL & TERRELL, supra note 68, at 4 ("The concept that woman was made from man is not
found in Indian religion. Indians accept and adhere to the doctrine that the female of their kind was created
simultaneously with the male. For apparent reasons, each was endowed with peculiar qualities and
sensibilities, neither was accorded supremacy, and each was made dependent upon the other for existence.")
72. Judith K. Brown, Iroquois Women: An Ethnohistoric Note, in TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF
WOMEN 239 (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 1975) (citing Alexander A. Goldenweiser, On Iroquois Work: 1912, in
SUMMARY REPORT OF THE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF CANADA 468 (1912)); see also Sarah W. Hopkins,
The Women Know as Much as the Men, in FIRE OF TIME, supra note 68, at 43 ("The women know as much
as the men do, and their advice is often asked. We have a republic as well as you. The council-tent is our
Congress, and anybody can speak who has anything to say, women and all.").
73. Lacey, supra note 70, at 358.
74. Id. at 368.
75. Rayna Green, Native American Women, 6 SIGNS 248, 253 (1980).
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ICRA is designed to protect individual rights from encroachments by the tribe,
Native American women are powerless to enforce such rights after the Santa
Clara decision. Women may be discriminatorily denied tribal membership along
with all of the benefits that accompany membership. Often rejected by and
culturally different from white society, many American Indian women may not
return to their former society, which includes most of their families.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR EXPANDING THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
The ICRA was passed to protect individual Indians and requires tribes to
enforce its provisions.76 Current membership laws reveal that many Native
American women are denied rights afforded to Native American men. For
example, the Cachil Dehe Band of Winton Indians discriminates against
women. The tribal constitution states:
[I]f a female member marries a non-Indian, she will automatically lose
her membership and will be required to leave the Community within
ninety days after written notice has been served upon her by the Busi-
ness Committee; Provided, That this provision shall not apply in the
case of any marriages consummated prior to the approval of this
Constitution and By-Laws.
77
Although tribes deprive women of their civil rights, the doctrine established
in Santa Clara declines to hold the tribes accountable in federal court for their
discriminatory actions. 78 Consequently, a Native American woman discriminat-
ed against by a tribe lacks a forum in which to bring her complaint.79 The
amendment proposed in this Note remedies the no-forum situation and allows
Native American women to rely upon the guarantees embodied in the ICRA.
A similar amendment to the ICRA was proposed by Senator Orrin Hatch of
Utah in 1988. However, as discussed below, the Hatch Amendment allows too
much federal intrusion upon tribal sovereignty.
76. See Hearings, supra note 46, at 85 (excerpt from meeting of United States Commission on Civil
Rights, Feb. 11, 1986).
77. CACHIL DEHE BAND OF WINTON INDIANS OF THE COLUSA INDIAN COMMUNITY/CAL. CONST. art.
II, §4. The constitution of the Kiahlagee Tribe also discriminates by allowing all adult children of male
members, but not of female members, to become members of the tribe by acceptance of members present
at a tribal meeting. KIAHLAGEE TRIBAL TOWN/OKLA. CONST. art. 11, §5, reprinted in Elmer Rusco, Civil
Liberties Guarantees Under Tribal Law: A Survey of Civil Rights Provisions in Tribal Constitutions, 14
Am. INDIAN L. REv. 269, 284 (1989).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
79. See Dehose v. Johnson (White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, Whiteriver, Ariz., Feb. 22, 1989)
(dismissal of woman's suit because of sovereign immunity doctrine) reprinted in Hearings, supra note 46,
at 233 (Sept. 29, 1989).
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A. United States Legislative Approach
On August 8, 1988, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced a bill to amend the
ICRA.80 If the amendment had passed, it would have granted federal courts
jurisdiction over claims that tribal courts had deprived individuals of their civil
rights."1 Jurisdiction would have been based on the plenary power of Congress
over Indian matters and would only have been allowed after the exhaustion of
tribal court remedies.
8 2
If Congress had approved the amendment, Indian tribes would likely have
viewed it as an intrusion on their sovereign powers.8 3 Although such an intru-
sion is within congressional powers, as demonstrated by the Major Crimes
Act and the ICRA,85 Hatch's proposal would have opened too many ave-
nues for federal intervention into tribal sovereignty.
Hatch's bill demonstrates a misunderstanding of the problems facing Indian
litigants when dealing with tribal governments. In his statement to the Senate,
Hatch reported that "tribal members enjoy the protection of their rights under
both the United States Constitution and the ICRA .... [I]t appears that non-
Indians are not granted the same privilege of dual citizenship in the Tribal
Court." 6 This overlooks the problem, illustrated by Santa Clara, that tribal
members, instead of being afforded dual privileges, are left with no privileges
when dealing with the tribal government.
37
Hatch proposed granting federal jurisdiction in two situations. First, federal
court jurisdiction should be conferred automatically in civil actions alleging a
denial of rights after the exhaustion of tribal remedies.88 Second, in special
circumstances, the Attorney General should be able to obtain federal jurisdiction
for a lawsuit by the United States without the exhaustion of tribal remedies.
89
Hatch used Santa Clara to win support for his bill by demonstrating how
individual civil rights were being violated.90 However, Hatch's bill was too
expansive and would have done little to preserve tribal sovereignty. The
80. 134 CONG. REc. Sll,656 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (statement of Senator Hatch). The Hatch
Amendment to the ICRA was never brought to the Senate floor for a vote.
81. Id. at SI1,654.
82. Id. at S 11,653, S 11,656.
83. Hearings, supra note 46, at 9 (Sept. 29, 1988). The testimony of Tom Tso, Chief Justice of the
Navajo Nation reflects this distrust. Tso stated that he wondered if investigation into enforcement of ICRA
had been undertaken "in order to help Indian nations or simply [tol find justification for Senator Hatch's
or other persons' proposals?" Id.
84. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 14-20.
86. 134 CONG. REc. S11,654 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1991) (statement of Senator Hatch) (quoting Little
Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal Court, 690 F Supp. 919, 923 (D. Mont. 1988), vacated, 708 F Supp. 1561
(D. Mont. 1989)).
87. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
88. 134 CONG. REC. S 11,655 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988).
89. Id. at S 11,655-56.
90. Id. at S 11, 654 ("Because of the enforcement problems that have occurred since the Martinez case,
time has now come to follow the Supreme Court's dictum and legislate a Federal court remedy.").
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amendment did not strike a balance between the needs of individual Indians
and tribal authority.91 By limiting the amendment, the proposal outlined in this
Note seeks to preserve as much tribal sovereignty as possible, thereby striking
a better balance between individual and tribal interests.
Congress has the plenary power over Indian tribes to pass an amendment
to the ICRA. Passing a bill to prevent discrimination against women would be
an extension of a much larger intrusion on Native American sovereignty already
imposed by the ICRA. However, the benefits of providing Native American
women with a voice in their own community weighs heavily in favor of such
protection. Support for the imposition of gender protection can be found in the
international community, which recognizes the pervasive problem of gender
discrimination.
B. A Forum for Native American Women
In 1967, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, which expressed a concern that women around
the world were being denied equal rights.92 It also recommended guidelines
for adoption by member states to address gender discrimination.93
The amendment proposed in this Note follows international standards of
equality and adds a new section to the ICRA to prevent discrimination against
Native American women, especially in the membership arena. Because many
tangible and intangible benefits accompany tribal membership,' special steps
must be taken to ensure these benefits equally for men and women. The propos-
91. Hatch asserted that "the bill that I am proposing today strikes a legitimate balance between the
interests of the tribal governments in exercising their powers of self-government and the rights which
Congress extended to individuals through the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act." Id. at S 11,656.
92. Declaration on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, art. 5, 1967 U.N.Y.B. 518, U.N.
Doc. A16716/1967. The United Nations declared that "[wlomen shall have the same rights as men to acquire,
change or retain their nationality" and that "[mlarriage to an alien shall not automatically affect the
nationality of the wife either by rendering her stateless or by forcing on her the nationality of her husband."
Declaration of Human Rights, [19481 3 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 15, U.N. Doc. A/811/1948.
93. Native American women need protection against gender discrimination within the Indian communi-
ty. The international community provides precedents for such protection in guidelines set forth by the United
Nations which is both multinational and multiethnic in its scope. For instance, the United Nations Human
Rights Committee criticized a gender-discriminatory Canadian Indian law. See Lovelace v. Canada, 36 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/3640 (1981); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, § 15, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in Human Rights: A Compilation of
International Instruments 8, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.2 (1983).
Canada, responding to this criticism from the international community, removed the gender-discriminat-
ing section of the Indian Act. Bill C-31, An Act to Amend the Indian Act, R.S.C., ch. 32 (1st Supp. 1985)
(Can.). Although Bill C-31 does not eliminate discrimination perfectly, many Indian groups, including the
Native Women's Association of Canada, view it as a starting point to the eventual elimination of all
discrimination in the Canadian Indian Act. NATIVE WOMEN'S AsSOCIATION OF CANADA, POSITION PAPER
ON THE INDIAN ACT 2-4 (1989).
It is important to note that international law is governed by consent. The Native American tribes are
not represented independently at the United Nations, and one could argue, therefore, that the tribes did not
consent to any proposals passed by the United Nations.
94. See JAMIESON, supra note I!, at 67-74; Paul, supra note 12.
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al prohibits tribal laws that discriminate on the basis of gender and provides
a two-year implementation period to give the tribes time to bring their laws into
compliance.95
By creating a special amendment to deal exclusively with the issue of
gender discrimination, this proposal tries to avoid the problem of the Hatch
amendment by minimizing encroachment on tribal courts' sovereignty. The
amendment focuses on membership for two reasons. First, monetary benefits
flow from membership. Second, these benefits are usually funded with federal
money, and, therefore, the disparate treatment of Native American men and
women constitutes discriminatory state action.
The remaining sections of this Note present and explain the language of
the proposed amendment. The language chosen is designed to expand the ICRA
narrowly, providing for specific gender protection while respecting a limited
tribal sovereignty.
C. Language of the Proposed Amendment
The Amendment should read:
§ 1 Equal Rights
No Indian tribe, or tribal authority receiving federal moneys, in exercising powers of
self-government shall:
(1) make or enforce any law that abridges the right to acquire, change, retain,
or pass down tribal membership on the basis of sex;
(2) violate the rights of women to participate in the political life of the tribe on
equal terms with men, including:
(a) the right to vote in all elections and to be eligible for election to all
publicly elected bodies;
(b) the right to vote in all public referenda; and
(c) the right to hold public office and to exercise all public functions; or
(3) deny on the basis of sex the right to acquire, administer, enjoy, inherit, or
bequeath property.
§ 2 Application and Remedy
(1) The Amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act shall not have effect until two
years after it is adopted by Congress.
(2) A violation of § I of this Amendment shall effect waiver of the tribe's
sovereign immunity from suit under § 2(3) of this Amendment.
(3) Any aggrieved Native American, following the exhaustion of tribal remedies
or a showing that such exhaustion would be futile, may sue in federal district
court for declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief against an Indian
tribe, tribal organization, or official thereof, alleging a failure to comply with
rights secured by this Amendment.
95. For a discussion of the limited retroactivity of the legislation, see infra note 101.
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D. Explanation of the Proposed Amendment
The proposed amendment allows Native American women the same equal
protection within their community that all United States citizens enjoy.96 The
language of the amendment focuses only on tribal membership laws, because
most benefits flow from membership status. At present, the benefits flow from
federal moneys that are allocated to the tribes, creating the appearance that the
discrimination is federally funded. The proposed limiting language retains
protection for tribal interests found in the ICRA, while guaranteeing women
the constitutional benefits originally envisioned under the ICRA.
1. Federal Funding97
The proposed amendment is limited to tribes or tribal authorities "receiving
federal moneys." Native American women who lose their status as tribal
members suffer economic hardship because they lose access to the government
funds and programs that are allocated to the Indian tribes. For example, any
"member of an Indian tribe" is a beneficiary of the Indian Self Determination
and Education Assistance Act.98 Tribes that discriminate against women,
thereby denying them the economic benefits under this Act, violate 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681. Section 1681 states: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance . . .
2. Section 1: Equality
Section 1(1) of the amendment addresses the concerns of three groups:
(1) Native American women subject to discriminatory membership laws,
(2) Native American women who are denied tribal membership due to gender-
biased laws, and (3) children of groups (1) and (2) who are denied member-
96. The proposed amendment will also protect the interests of men who have suffered discrimination
by a tribe. For example, the Crow and Quapaw tribes allow women to vote in tribal elections when they
are 18 years old; men, however, cannot vote until they are 21. CRow TRIBAL COUNCIL CONST. art. 1m,
reprinted in Rusco, supra note 77, at 285; Resolution Delegating Authority to the Quapaw Tribal Business
Committee (Aug. 19, 1936), reprinted in id.
97. The federal funding, or benefits, may also be thought of as reparations. Most of the payments to
the tribes are based on treaty provisions.
98. 25 U.S.C. § 450(b) (1988).
99. 20 U.S.C. § 168 l(a) (1989). Moreover, denying federally funded health benefits to Native American
women would also violate 42 U.S.C. § 3123, which states: "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance under [this chapter]." 42 U.S.C. § 3123
(1989).
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ship.10° This section will prohibit the gender discrimination generally imposed
on Native American women who marry outside the tribe. The words "acquire"
and "change" allow women who have married nonmembers and lost their status
as members of the tribe to seek the reinstatement of their tribal member-
ship. l0 l The word "retain" ensures that no additional women will lose their
membership for marrying a nonmember. Finally, the "pass down" language
prevents children from being excluded as a result of their mothers' marriages
to non-Native Americans, and it allows children who already have been exclud-
ed to become members.
The "pass down" provision addresses an important issue, because adverse
psychological effects accompany the monetary benefits lost by nonrecognized
children:
"If Indian women who have lost their rights cannot pass their band
membership to their children, it is likely that all their efforts to give
their children an identity will be destroyed. It would be very harmful
to the children's sense of identity .... It is a time in their lives when
they cannot easily endure the rejection of their identity by an entire
band.""
The remaining portion of section 1 of the amendment protects important
interests that traditionally have followed membership. That portion guarantees
Native American women not only nominal membership, but also the rights and
privileges that properly accompany that status.
3. Section 2: Application and Remedy
The two-year grace period provides Indian tribes with sufficient time to
comply with the antidiscrimination policy without outside interference. This
leeway allows tribes time to modify membership codes and to educate tribal
judges, officials, and other members.
100. Discriminatory tribal membership ordinances are divided between those in which women lose
membership for marrying outside their tribes and those like Santa Clara Pueblo's in which children of
women who marry outside the tribe lose their membership. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,
52 n.3 (1978) (example of tribal membership ordinance).
101. The proposed amendment would have limited retroactive effect, Women and children who suffered
discrimination under pre-amendment membership laws are given a right to petition the tribes for reinstate-
ment. The amendment does not, however, allow descendants to bring post mortem petitions on behalf of
these individuals. The burden that limited reinstatement would place on the tribes is minimal compared to
complete retroactivity. The amendment would not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution,
which apply to criminal, not civil, legislation. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 500 (11th
ed. 1985).
102. See Paul, supra note 12, at 41 (quoting Holmes).
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The federal court jurisdiction is designed to be as limited as possible while
still enabling enforcement of the proposal.103 A violation of the amendment
would act as a waiver of sovereign immunity, carving out an exception to the
general rule set forth in Santa Clara.104 This exception would be allowed only
after the exhaustion of tribal court remedies, unless the aggrieved party can
show that exhaustion would be futile'05 due to a history of unreasonable
delays or unreasonable tribal court practices.1"s Such limited judicial review
responds to Native Americans' requests for "help in protecting [tribal members]
from [their own) government."'0 7
CONCLUSION
The Santa Clara decision showed great respect for the sovereignty of
Native American tribes.' Yet in awarding such unrestricted sovereignty, the
Court has left Native American women powerless within their communities.
Native American women are suffering economically and psychologically
because of gender discrimination within their tribes.
The Indian Civil Rights Act was designed to protect the individual rights
of Native Americans.t" 9 Hearings before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
have shown that tribal courts are not affording this protection to the individuals
within their jurisdictions. In light of the current plight of Native American
women, an expansion of the ICRA is warranted. Congress has a duty to provide
an enforcement mechanism for the rights enumerated in the ICRA. Without
statutory gender protection such as the amendment proposed by this Note,
Native American women may find themselves at the mercy of the tribes, with
no avenue open to fight systematic discrimination. An amendment to the ICRA
providing for specific gender protection would guarantee that tribes will treat
Native American women in a fair and equitable manner.
103. The focus of this amendment is defined narrowly in order to preserve tribal powers to the fullest
extent possible. The purpose of this amendment is not to destroy tribal sovereignty, but rather to guarantee
American Indian women the right to participate in that sovereignty by protecting membership equality.
104. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (tribes have sovereign immunity from civil
suits).
105. For example, futility would be found if the woman can offer convincing proof that the lack of
separation of powers makes the tribal court "a sort of 'kangaroo court"' subject to control by other tribal
officials. See, e.g., Little Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal Court, 690 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Mont. 1988).
106. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 46, at 71 (Sept. 29, 1989) (testimony of Judge Rousseau, Sisseton-
Wahpeton tribal judge) (referring to lack of separation of powers within tribal court system that can result
in collusion by tribal officials).
107. The Indian Civil Rights Act Amendment of 1988, supra note 47, at S11,655 (quoting letter from
tribal member received Sept. 6, 1985).
108. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
109. See id. at 61 (quoting S. REP. No. 841, supra note 7, at 5-6).
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